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IV

ARGUMENT
Appellee has advanced five positions: (1) there is no basis for considering
Appellant's constitutional issues because they were not preserved below; (2) even if they
were to be considered by this Court, they lack merit because Appellant has no property
interest in the survivor annuity, and all constitutional processes "due" were offered at the
hearing below; (3) Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405 has been misread by Appellant because,
at the time of Mr. Montierth's death, he was a "retiree," not a member; (4) the AHO did
consider the hearsay testimony of Appellant, and a specific finding in respect of that issue
- "intent" - is not necessary; (5) with regard to the incomplete Retirement Application, it
is sufficient to point out that Mr. Montierth's signature on Page 1 was notarized.

I. THERE IS NO LEGAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A "RIGHT" TO THE
RETIREMENT BENEFIT, A "PROPERTY INTEREST" IN THE RETIREMENT
BENEFIT, A "VESTED" PROPERTY INTEREST IN THE RETIREMENT
BENEFIT, OR A "CONTRACTUALLY VESTED INTEREST" IN THE
RETIREMENT BENEFIT.
In Appellant's Opening Brief, she went to some length to demonstrate the
evolution and development of the courts' recognition, both here, and in California, of a
non-employee spouse's legal interest in her husband's retirement benefit. After
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982) there should be no dispute that Mrs.
Montierth had a legally protected interest in the retirement benefit, which virtually is
recognized in all Utah dissolution decrees. Appellee argues, however, in syllogistic
fashion, that actually, Appellant has no interest whatsoever. The argument is best
appreciated on Page 12 of the Board's Brief.
1

a-

Public pension and retirement systems give rise to vested contractual rights.

b.

These vested contractual rights constitute a property interest.

c.

Accordingly, a person who has no vested contractual right does not have a
property interest.

Therefore: Because Appellant did not have a vested contractual right, she has no
property interest.
Fascinating logic, to say the least. The problem, of course, is that the syllogism
ends with conclusion "c". The statement about Appellant is a complete non-sequitur,
disconnected to the major and minor premises above. Blithely stating that she does not
have a property interest begs the central inquiry, ignores both Woodward, supra, the
cases Appellee itself has marshaled to support its argument: Horn v. Utah Dep't of Public
Safety, 962 P.2d 95 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Utah Public Employees Ass 'n v. State of Utah,
2006 UT 9 (Utah 2006), is squarely at odds with Section 49-13-405, and explicitly
contradicts a central premise of Appellee's own argument.
Not necessarily in order of importance, we first examine Horn v. Utah Dep 7 of
Public Safety, 962 P.2d 95 (Utah App. 1998). In Horn, the issue was whether the
plaintiff could use the Personnel Management Act, and implementing regulations, to
establish an employment contract. The court said no, explaining that the contractually
vested rights (to pension and retirement benefits) of a plan member are not analogous to
statutory rights. Id. at 100. The court also remarked that retirement benefits "vest" when
the employee attains retirement age. Id.

2

In Utah Public Employees Ass 'n v. State of Utah 2006 UT 9 (Utah 2006), the
Supreme Court, against the backdrop of thousands of angry public employees, wrestled
with whether a pending bill retroactively could alter the "cash-in or transfer" policy then
applicable to sick leave benefits upon employment termination. The technical question,
Judge Wilkins wrote, was whether the mere enactment of a statute constitutes a "taking"
under the due process clause, which question, in turn, rested on whether plaintiffs had a
protectable property interest in redeeming banked sick leave hours in a particular way.
IdM 12. Ultimately, the court said the employees did not. Both decisions, when read
together as respects this case, recite first, the obvious: vesting occurs when pre-vesting
conditions have been met; and, second, they fortify Appellant's claim, by re-emphasizing
that her husband had a contractually vested right to his retirement benefits, which,
following Woodward, means she had the same right.
It is clear that Wes Montierth's retirement benefits vested; indeed he paid $35,817
to ensure that. (Transcript, pp. 38, 39, 42). We have demonstrated conclusively through
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988), Estate of Frank Annelo, Jr. v.
McQueen, et al, 953 P.2d 1143 (Utah 1998), and Culbertson v. Continental Assurance
Co.,631 P.2d 906 (Utah 1981), that without reservation, Utah courts recognize a nonemployee spouse's "right to" retirement benefits - once they vest. When Mr. Montierth's
retirement benefits vested, so did Appellant's pursuant to Woodward v. Woodward, 656
P.2d 431 (Utah 1982).l She is on equal footing with her husband regarding accrual and

1

Appellee continues to resist this clear principle. On Page 46, n. 18, it writes: "Mr.
Montierth owns any claim that he failed to complete the retirement application in some
3

vesting. Third, the Utah legislature has so clearly recognized this concept, that it has
legislated a non-employee spouse's right to retirement benefits even if they do not
technically vest. As we know, Section 49-13-405 bestows the annuity on a nonemployee spouse if her husband dies before retirement, thus explicitly recognizing the
spouse's interest in, and right to, the benefit as it accrues year to year. The Board appears
mistakenly mesmerized by the concept of "vesting" when Woodward clearly stated the
term is not definitive as a test of a spouse's claim to retirement property. Id. at 432-33.
The Board is left in the contradictory position of administering a retirement system
that "gives" a non-employee spouse an annuity, pursuant to §49-13-405, prior to
retirement "vesting," conceding that the retirement benefit of Appellant's husband vested
upon his retirement, acknowledging that under In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838,
544 P.2d 561 (1976); Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982); Estate of
Frank Annelo, Jr. v. McQueen, et al., 953 P.2d 1143 (Utah 1998) and progeny, the
concept of vesting is deemed irrelevant, and that both spouses have a protectable right to
and interest in, retirement benefits, yet clinging to the indefensible position that Appellant
has "no standing" to raise the instant claim because she does not have what they term is a

way," implying that only Mr. Montierth can have an interest in the benefit. Appellee's
brief is replete with the assumption that Mrs. Montierth had no right to retirement
benefits because: only a "member" can obtain vesting rights, only a "member" can
submit a retirement application, and only a "member" has "contributions on deposit."
Appellee's Brief, p. 38. The Board loses sight of the fact that retirement benefits vest,
not members. The logical implication of the Board's view is that non-employee spouses
in Utah have no right to the cars, home or checking account of their husband solely
because he purchased them.
4

'Vested ijiiilfiklii.ii i if»:lii ' llh 1 board's argument is baffling, and internally
contradictory.
In response, Appellee argues, on Pages 34-39, that any reliance on Woodward is
misplaced because: (1) Woodward only stands foi the proposition I lint "non-vested"
retirement benefits may be included in a marital estate; (2) the non-employee spouse has
only a speculative potential contract right; (3) this "right to" does not exist until a court
order so decrees; (4) a "right to" a percentage of the retirement benefit is not a property
right; and (5) Utah Code Ann. §49-1 l-612(3)(a) proves this. Short shrift can be made of
this improbable logic. First, a retirement benefit is property, personal property and so
deemed by Utah courts. Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed (1999), p. 1252, defines property
as 1:1:le right to possess, use, and enjoy a determinate thing: i.e., a right to ownership.
Personal property means any movable or intangible thing subject to ownership and not
classified as real property. The Woodward court, in discussing retirement benefits and
vesting, said "[it] . . . is an inappropriate basis for determining what property should be
subject to equitable division .. . ." Id. at 432-33. In Greene v. Greene, 751 P.2d 827,
831 (Utah App. 1988), the court held: ". . . retirement benefits accrued in whole or in
part during marriage constitiite mutual property iiiider the Utah law . . . " (emphasis
added). To be sure, as in thousands of related or unrelated cases, it may take a court
order to distribute the property equitably, but a court does not create the right as the
Board confuses itself by so stating on Page 36, it enforces the riglit Fiilally, Section 4911-612(3)(a) actually disproves the Board's assertion. This section expressly recognized

5

the "right to" defined contributions, allowances, death benefits, refunds by non-employee
spouses, once it is directed "how" to divide them by a court.
Appellee also asserts that because Appellant is not a member (i.e., one who makes
contributions) "she cannot. .. obtain a vested right, and thus maintains no individual
property interest in her husband's retirement benefit." Appellee Brief, p. 39. It is hard to
appreciate just how confused this reasoning is. It is the retirement benefit that vests, not
members; they (along with their spouses) only own the right to the benefit. The
Montierth retirement benefit did vest. Both Appellant and her husband therefore have a
"right to" this vested benefit under Utah law. Indeed, both began securing a legally
recognized right to this benefit from the first day the benefit started to accrue: "to the
extent the right has so accrued, it is subject to equitable distribution." Woodward at 43233.
II.

WAIVER, CLEAR ERROR AND EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES,
Understandably, the bulk of Appellee's 47-page brief is spent arguing that

Appellant has no standing to bring the constitutional arguments not articulated below.2
Appellee's somewhat repetitive argument misses completely the point advanced by
Appellant and inexplicably does not even address two key issues.
A.

Criminal Cases Have Limited Applicability
State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994) [aggravated sexual abuse]; State v.

Winfield, 2006 UT 4 (Utah 2006) [aggravated robbery]; State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 41, 48
2

The record is clear that the associate representing Mrs. Montierth at the hearing did not
raise them.
6

P.JQ 9 J I (utan zuol ; i ild sodomy]; State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) [second
degree murder]; State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) [sexual abuse]; State v.
Buford, 820 P.2d 1381 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) [possession of controlled substance]; State
v. Holgate, 2000 Ul ?.| 10 1' nl ) l<> (i Kali :<M)0i JiinirtK 11 an all uiiuiii.il cases. •
Certainly, they enrich the waiver discussion, but their holdings are limited for two
reasons. First, each case dealt with a piece of evidence, or testimony, to which no
objection was lodged at trial Here, there is no claim of improperly admitted evidence,
and no failed objection to analyze. Second, the policy consideration which supports
waiver in these cases - that the trial judge should be given the opportunity to bring his/her
experience and independent judgment to the objection ~ again, is not present in this case.
One can hardly equate an AHO, employed by the Board, or better yet, the Board itself (as
final adjudicative officer), to an independent state court judge whose experience and
principally based decision might assist the appellate court greatly. Indeed, we hear no
argument from the Board, now sitting as Appellee advocate, that had it been given the
opportunity below, it might have sustained a constitutional challenge to its own actions or
administrative regulations. This silence conclusively exposes, as pretense, any
implicatu

t raising the arguments at (in hearing would have helped. In short, the

foundational pillars upon which the waiver argument rests, in a criminal case, are simply
absent here.
B.

The Exceptions to Waiver are not Technical
The Board goes to considerable effort to demonstrate that there are two, and only

two, exceptions to waiver - plain error and exceptional circumstance, and that both are
7

demanding in precision. Actually, the opposite is the case, certainly with regard to
exceptional circumstances.
The Archambeau court, which invariably is cited by all cases including the Utah
Supreme Court, admitted that realistically the "exception categories" are "sufficiently
broad to encompass any situation requiring a Utah appellate court's consideration of a
constitutional issue, for the first time, in the interests of justice." State of Utah v.
Archambeau,&20 P.2d 920, 926 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The court explained that this
"catchall" exception works as a "safety device". Archambeau at 923. The Utah Supreme
Court echoed this approach just two years ago.
Recently, we have applied the exception sparingly, reserving it for
the most unusual circumstances where our failure to consider an
issue that was not properly preserved for appeal would have resulted
in manifest injustice. The Court of Appeals has aptly characterized
the concept as a "safety device" against injustice, (citing
Archambeau)
State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, 94 P.3d 186, 191 (Utah 2004). See also, State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1216 (Utah 1993), (we have discretion to address claims not raised
at trial under exceptional circumstances and to avoid a miscarriage of justice).
With regard to plain error, in an advertent way, the Board has boot-strapped its
own argument with respect to this doctrine, particularly if the test is subjective. Under
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), the error must be obvious

3

In a confusing discussion on Pages 17-18, n. 4, the Board argues that the concept of
manifest injustice may be confined to objections raised under Rule 19(c) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Board's analysis is based on State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d
55, n. 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), but nothing in Irwin is so limiting.

8

to the trier of fact. If the Board cannot understand the Appellant's constitutional claims
here, on appeal, infra, when they have been spelled out in detail, it seems particularly true
that they would not have been obvious to either the AHO or the Board below.
C.

The Board Failed to Respond to the "bxceptional Circumstance Advanced by
Appellant.
Important by its absence, the Board mentioned only in passing "the

circumstances" Appellant has offered as exceptional, yet this analysis should have been
the centerpiece of its response. The sole reference is found on Page 31, n. 12. The Board
simply identifies them, and then dismisses their importance as being "modest" examples
only, and not previously recognized by appellate courts.
The underlying merits of this case are so compelling, and the damage to the
Montierth family so great, however, these alone would warrant initial review on appeal.
A mother and four children have now lost their lifetime source of income, over $800,000.
They were relegated to this position because the Board failed to give her notice, or
opportunity to object, to her husband's election of Plan 1, which stripped her of a benefit
all courts in Utah definitively say she has: a right to public retirement benefits. At
another level going forward, the system the Board has used, and is using, to administer its
retirement-election-survivor-annuity program is devoid of any "notice and opportunity to
object" mechanism; it is not Montierth specific. Hence, this system, or lack thereof, does
presently, and will hereinafter continue, to impact scores of women each year who are
disenfranchised by a sloppy, unstable or deliberately uncharitable husband. Because this
flavor of constitutional denial will continue into the future, it takes the instant

9

"circumstances" completely out of the normal case-specific injury category. Whether
exceptional circumstances, manifest injustice, or in the interests of justice, is the correct
label, is immaterial; the catchall niche of the waiver doctrine appears inescapable in this
special context. And yet, the Board did not devote a single line to these circumstances.
Rather, it dismissively stated "Petitioner cannot point to any exceptional circumstances . .
. to invoke the exception." (Appellee Brief, p. 31). That was it.
Also ignored by the Board is an equally compelling reason to trump the waiver
doctrine. The very heart of the policy supporting waiver is the assumption that timely
raising an issue will allow the trial court to deal with it, perhaps even resolve the issue.
But as alluded to above, that consideration is nowhere to be found in this setting. It is
highly improbable that an AHO would ever conclude that the Board's pre-election
retirement scheme was unconstitutional, no matter how scintillating the argument
advanced. And certainly the Board, by rigidly defending its actions here as a party
litigant, cannot now protest that, had it heard these very claims when it was sitting as
"final arbiter" six months ago, it might have ruled against itself.4
Finally, and dispositive, Utah courts have held, without exception, that little, or no,
deference is paid to the Board's analysis of legal issues. Gottfredson v. Utah State
Retirement Board, 808 P.2d 153, 154 (Utah App. 1991) stated it best: because the appeal
presents an issue of law "we therefore apply a correction-of-error standard where we
extend no deference to the agency's conclusions." To the same effect is Horton v. Utah
4

It is telling to note that, if the Board had thought any position of Appellant was
meritorious on appeal, it would have sought a remand from this Court to consider the
case. It did not.
10

State Retirement Board, 842 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah App. 1992). In Johnson v. Utah State
Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Utah 1980), noted previously, the court
cynically, but accurately, observed that agencies do not generally determine the
constitutional!

Uieir organic legislation.

Both the Board's unlikely independence as a trier of fact, and the limited
deference given to its legal interpretations of constitutional law, reinforce the injunction
of futility. The doctrine of futility is invoked both successfully and unsuccessfully in
many contexts by Utah courts. Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Meyers, 871 P.2d 104 : . 1046
(Utah Ct. App. 1999) (leave to amend unnecessary if futile); Hipwell v. IHC Hospital, 82
P.3d 1076 (Utah 2003) (motion to amend futile if new action is moot); Patterson Const
v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7; 67 P.3d 466 (Utah 2003) (futility of exhausting
administrative remedies, denied); First Security Bank of Utah v. Creech, et al, 858 P.2d
958 (Utah 1993) (motion to lift stay an exercise in futility, dissent); State of Utah v. Dale,
681 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1984) (futility of ruling on two motions on the same ground); Rice,
Melby Enterprises v. Salt Lake County, 646 P.2d 696 (Utah 1982) (entering into contract,
because of the futility of refusing to do so); Ludahl v. Larson, 586 P.2d 439 (Utah 1978)
(request, even if granted, would make no difference); Mills v. Gronning, et al, 581 P.2d
1334 (Utah 1978) (for employee to have a "good cause" basis for his grievance, he must
first attempt to work out problem); Nuzum, et al v. Construction and Mining Corp., et
al, 566 P.2d I I I ! 111 tali 1997) (an appellate review would be futile if it amounted to
rubber-stamping Industrial Commission orders); L. W. Flynn v. W.P. Harlin Const, 509
P.2d 356 (Utah 1973) (futility of a trial by a jury, if judge is going to set it aside); State of
11

Utah v. Belwood, 494 P.2d 519 (Utah 1972) (no reason to grant a new trial solely on a
technical error, if the result will be the same). A review of some fifty Utah cases on this
point show that there is no elegance to the definition of futility: it is simply invoked
whenever common sense demonstrates that the challenged action, or lack thereof, would
not have mattered anyway.
Thus, with respect to each "exceptional circumstance'"' - the catastrophic harm to
the Montierth family - the ongoing nature of the problem statewide - the obvious
implausibility of the Board ruling against itself below - and the lack of deference paid to
the Board's legal analysis by Utah courts - the Appellee was non-responsive. Whether it
misunderstood the importance of this piece, or simply had nothing to offer, its silence is
particularly remarkable on a key issue.
III. THE BOARD HAS CONFUSED THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES HERE
BEING CHALLENGED.
The Board has organized a very effective argument that due process
considerations were fully met in the context of the administrative hearing. On Pages 11
and 12, and on Pages 3 3 - 3 4 , the Board argues successfully that Appellant had a right to
counsel, did have counsel, received notice of the hearing, called a witness, and presented
argument.5 The Appellee concludes " . . . Petitioner received all the process she was

5

The key section heading reads " . . . The Board Granted Petitioner Constitutional
Procedural Due Process by Granting Her a Full and Fair Hearing." The title is pregnant
with one implication. It does not matter what the Board failed to do constitutionally in
processing the retirement selection; all is cured by affording an administrative hearing.
12

due

" This statement is correct, but completely irrelevant. There is no claim of due

process denial at the hearing.
The issue, indeed the epicenter of Appellant's Brief, is the constitutional denial of
notice and opportunity to object to her husband's pre-retirement selection on August 16,
2002, two years before the hearing. This argument is spelled out in detail on pages 11-14
in Montierth's Brief, in a section entitled: "HI. Petitioner Has Been Deprived of Property
in Violation of the Utah and United States Constitutions By Failing to Provide Notice and
Opportunity to Object" The only rejoinder offered by the Board to the precise
constitutional question advanced by Appellant is found on Page 33. The Board simply
noted: The argument "makes no cognitive sense." It did i i.c >t explain or defend its preretirement application system. It simply said nothing. Although it is unclear why, in 47
pages of brief the Board devoted but a single sentence to the issue, seemingly oblivious to
the importance of the argument. Indeed, it came close to insulting the Montierth family
by stating: "One must wonder what kind of harm Petitioner believes that she has suffered
by not being able to bring a claim at the time her husband made his retirement plan
election (since she was able to challenge it after he died)." Appellee Brief, p. 34.
Perhaps Mrs. Montierth and her four minor children could "wonder" about the loss
of $800,000, for starters. Either the Board conceded the argument, or became so
enamored with an easier, but irrelevant target - due process at the hearing ~ that it
i oiiiplelcly missed the issue. Thus, in sequence, first exceptional circumstances, and now
the constitutional issues, the Board has chosen not to confront a linchpin Appellant
position.

13

IV. POINT BY POINT REJOINDER TO UNRELATED POSITIONS
ADVANCED BY THE BOARD.
A number of arguments or statements advanced by the Board are better handled by
subsection rejoinders.
A,

Hearsay or Not Hearsay.
Hearsay, in any context, can be difficult, but when the issue is "belief," it is often

black ice. The question is Mr. Montierth's belief as to what he did, not what he said he
did, not what he did. As we tried to state precisely on page 17: the statement he made to
his wife (that she would be covered if he died) was offered to demonstrate that he
actually believed he had selected a plan that protected Appellant. There was no other
evidence as respects what he believed he had done - only the application showing what
he did. Mistakenly, the Board takes this as direct evidence of intent: "Mr. Montierth's
notarized statement. . . shows his express intent to select retirement Plan One." Appellee
Brief, page 20, n. 6. No, it only shows that he signed the document. Mr. Monti erth never
said he made a mistake. Just the opposite, he seemed to express the belief that he had
correctly chosen a plan which contained a survivor annuity. The importance of this piece
of evidence is apparent when coupled with the incomplete Application for Service
Retirement. Neither the AHO nor the Board ever directly confronted the obvious
connection between the two when it made its finding... (no evidence to support the
claim that Mr. Montierth mistakenly selected Plan 1).
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B.

Incomplete Application for Retirement Benefits.
Given the reinforcement by the Utah Supreme Court in Utah Public Employees

Association v. State of Utah, 2006 UT 9 (Utah 2006), that public employee pension and
retirement benefits are contractual in nature, tl le ii ICOI i iplete " Vpplicatioi I for Ser\ ice
Retirement" becomes all the more important. Since there is a clear issue going to what
Mr. Montierth believed he was doing, then page 2 of the Application (the contract),
which relates specifically to "understanding the choice made" becomes all the more
important in establishing the "meeting of the minds" requirement of contract formation.
The Board's answer to this assertion is found on Page 14 of its Brief. Citing Utah Code
Ann. §49-13-401 the Board argues that once Appellant's husband submitted a notarized
signature and a selection retirement date, the "retirement application was complete." The
Board dismisses, without comment, any mention of the second page.
Utah Code Ann. §49-13-401(b) is a "qualifying" predicate to eligibility, it hardly
speaks to the issue raised. Second, the document remains problematical as an inspection
shows. It is signed on August 16, 2002, yet the 16 of July, one month earlier, is selected
as a retirement date, and apparently he had not worked since May 30* , two months
earlier. The box above his signature reads, "I understand tl le Hi i litations as described on
the reverse side of this form." However, the absence of his signature on the reverse side,
which reads, "The above statements and options have been reviewed with me by a
counselor," deepens the suspicion that it was filled out quickly with no care,
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completeness or understanding. Despite this deficiency, this is "the" document the
Board produces as conclusive evidence that Mr. Montierth waived his wife's right to an
$800,000 survivor annuity. We recall at this juncture the observations of Eldredge v.
Utah State Retirement Board, 795 P.2d 671, 676 (Utah App. 1990) that this document
represents ". .. the irrevocable one-in-a-lifetime retirement decision . .. (which) imposes
a strict duty of certitude upon those charged with the supervision and implementation of
the system." At the very least Montierth is owed an explanation as to why this second
page remained unsigned. But at a more fundamental level, why, we ask rhetorically, is
the Board's stringent duty as a fiduciary left in the hands of administrators who only
"presume" that the retiring member understands his selection, and who make no effort to
scrutinize, question and carefully explain the consequences of an election, particularly
one that disenfranchises a spouse. It is recalled that Mrs. Montierth's name is clearly set
out no page one.
C.

Not Designating the Section Being Reviewed Under §63-46b-15(4).
The admonition in King v. Industrial Com 'n of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281, 1287 n.7

(Utah App. 1993)7 is well taken, but realistically not in play in the instant matter because
Appellant's attack is broadly constitutional in nature and does not focus on a specific
Board interpretation of a statute. In King, the claimant sought reversal of the IC's order
6

Charged with fiduciary responsibility, and given the fact that the second page
admonition is of the Board's own creation, it is exasperating that the Appellee simply
ignores page two. To the same effect is the statement on Page 47 of its Brief to the effect
that Montierth did not present a "scintilla" of evidence to show that page two was
incomplete. It is almost as though the Board tries to "pretend-away" evidence or law it
does not like.
7
The correct citation is n.6.
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denying him temporary disability. The question in King, unlike here, was what standard
of review is applicable when the court reviews a Board interpretation of a statute with
respect to which discretion has been granted. The court did re-emphasize the review
standard applicable here: "The standard we apply when an agency interprets or applies
general law . .. constitutional law . . . our review . .. (is) a correction of error standard,
giving no deference to the agency's decision." Id. at 1285. See also, Epperson v. Utah
State Retirement Bd, 949 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah App. 1997).
The Board also cites Utah Code Ann. §49-11-203(l)(k) on page 5 of its Brief, for
the proposition that because the Board is charged to develop broad policies and programs,
its interpretation must be upheld if reasonable and rational. That may be true, but for the
same reasons just explicated, is irrelevant here: The Board did not interpret anything.
D.

The Reach and Implication of Section 49-13-405(2)
Appellant has argued that on its face, Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405(2) allows a

spouse to request that her husband be deemed to have retired under Plan Three when he
dies. Appellee, as anticipated, claims, on Page 19 of its Brief, that Utah Code Ann. §4913-405(2) is limited to members who die before retirement, relying on the definition of
"member" in Utah Code Ann. §49-1 l-102(23)(a).8 The Board explains the policy behind
Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405(2) as follows: "Those members with long-term service to
the public who die not having retired and selected a retirement option, are allowed a
continuing benefit to their spouse," while those who have elected a plan are excluded.

8

The Board cites incorrectly to §49-11-102(22) which applies to inactive members.
Appellee Brief, p. 19.
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(Appellee Brief, p. 40). Yes, that accurately describes what happens, but it doesn't
explain why it happens. The real problem with allowing Mrs. Montierth the same right,
argues the Board, is that it would frustrate the "actuarial soundness" of the Plan. The
Board is concerned that all plan participants would elect option one which pays out a
slightly higher monthly benefit, then switch to Plan 3 upon death. That concern, which
can be real, is easily remedied by offsets down the line, which Appellant specifically
requested. (See letter of February 15, 2005, from Crofts to Newman). The difference in
treatment, we submit, remains unconvincing since it creates two classes of spouses with
identical constitutional rights. One receives a survivor annuity, even though the
retirement benefit has not technically vested because of the premature death of her
spouse. The second receives nothing, even though the retirement benefit has vested,
because of the sloppy, unstable or deliberate lack of charity of her husband. Both
spouses are innocent of any wrongdoing, and neither participated in a retirement selection
decision.
V.
THE BOARD CONCEDED KEY ARGUMENTS BY FAILING TO
RESPOND.
Despite the length and breadth of the Board's Brief, it ignored a panoply of central
arguments advanced by Appellant.
It failed to respond to the "exceptional circumstances" set forth by Appellant (the
harm to the Montierths, etc.), or the futility of presenting the constitutional issues below.
Instead, it ground away at the technical requirements of plain error in the context of
criminal cases. It missed, or misunderstood, the nature of the constitutional challenge,
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focusing instead on due process requirements at the hearing. It tiptoed around State of
Utah v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991), a case cited by all courts, which
held that waiver could be overcome "in the interests of justice." Indeed on Page 17 of its
Brief, it denied the holding: "This is simply untrue." It never explained, or defended, a
system that fails to provide a non-employee spouse with an opportunity to review her
husband's retirement plan selection before she is divested, or the obvious inconsistency
between that system, and the policy under §49-13-405(2), which awards a survivor
benefit to wives of "members" prior to vesting. It ignored, without comment, the
prevailing Utah law requiring clear and specific waivers before property rights can be
relinquished. It did not rebut Appellant's argument that the Board is a fiduciary and
owed a fiduciary duty to all members (which includes spouses). And, it seemed
unconcerned that page 2 of the Application for Service Retirement Benefit was unsigned,
shrugging off, without comment, Judy Lund's statement that the Board only "presumes
the member has selected the right plan" and does nothing else to verify it (in violation of
its own page 2 requirement). Finally, it does not identify the standard of review for
decisions of law by the Board - no deference - but instead cites inapplicable case law
dealing with code section interpretation.
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing, we respectfully request that the appeal be granted on the
terms previously stated: (1) that the Application for Service Retirement be disregarded as
incomplete and legally ineffective, and that her 2005 request to receive the annuity be
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granted under §49-13-405(2); or alternatively, (2) that the legislative and administrative
scheme here discussed be declared unconstitutional, that the Board be reversed, and that
the ALJ be ordered to grant Appellant her annuity; or in the event the Court seeks the
Board's view of the constitutional issues raised in this proceeding, (3) that a remand to
the Administrative Law Judge be made pursuant to Johnson v. Utah State Retirement
Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980).
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